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SUMMARY
The current WHO policy during measles outbreaks focuses on case management rather than
reactive vaccination campaigns in urban areas of resource-poor countries having low vaccine
coverage. Vaccination campaigns may be costly, or not timely enough to impact signiﬁcantly on
morbidity and mortality. We explored the time available for intervention during two recent
epidemics. Our analysis suggests that the spread of measles in African urban settings may not be
as fast as expected. Examining measles epidemic spread in Kinshasa (DRC), and Niamey (Niger)
reveals a progression of smaller epidemics. Intervening with a mass campaign or in areas where
cases have not yet been reported could slow the epidemic spread. The results of this preliminary
analysis illustrate the importance of revisiting outbreak response plans.
INTRODUCTION
Although global incidence has been signiﬁcantly
reduced through vaccination, measles remains an
important public health problem. This disease
remains the leading vaccine-preventable killer of
children worldwide, and is estimated to have caused
614000 global deaths in 2002 with 50% of these
occurring in sub-Saharan Africa [1]. The persistence
of measles in many African countries indicates the
need to further investigate the dynamics of measles
epidemics in these areas as well as our approach to
epidemic control.
On declaring a measles epidemic, the question
of whether to conduct a mass campaign is almost
always raised. The current World Health Organiz-
ation (WHO) recommendations [2], based on a
literature review of measles outbreaks from 1963 to
1995 [3], emphasize case management rather than
mass vaccination interventions. This is for two main
reasons: (1) measles spreads too rapidly within urban
areas to allow suﬃcient time for implementation of a
mass vaccination campaign; and (2) as a result of
the lost time, the number of prevented cases is low,
and thus the resulting cost per prevented case is high
[2, 3]. The recommendations conclude that there
is insuﬃcient evidence either for demonstrating the
positive impact of a reactive vaccination campaign
or the usefulness of such a strategy [2]. The WHO
recommendations suggest that reactive vaccination
campaigns, if implemented, should focus only on
areas where infection has not yet occurred, or in
closed populations such as those in refugee or military
camps, or schools.
There have been few documented successful re-
active mass vaccination campaigns in low-vaccination
coverage contexts. One such intervention occurred
in rural Peru in 1993 [4]. The intervention, targeting
all non-measles cases between 6 months and
15 years over a period of approximately 1 week, was
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There were only two cases reported after the end of
the intervention, both in children under 6 months [4].
Its success was attributed to two principal factors.
First, before the outbreak, a large proportion of
the population was susceptible because of the geo-
graphical characteristics of the health district. This
meant that prior exposure, whether to measles or
vaccination, was unlikely. Second, the households
in the village were dispersed, leading to slower
transmission.
There may be important lessons from the control
strategy applicable to African urban centres where
epidemics often occur. In two recent measles out-
breaks, one in the city of Kinshasa, Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) (2002–2003) (population
y5000000) and one in the city of Niamey, Niger
(2003–2004) (population y750000), the medical non-
governmental organization Me ´ decins sans Frontie ` res
(MSF) documented outbreaks of lengthy duration,
suggesting a more complex spatial-temporal spread
than previously recognized. The countrywide measles
vaccination coverage estimate for DRC prior to
the outbreak was 45% and for Niger 64% [5]. The
populations of these cities were not distributed evenly
and there was limited internal mobility within the city
(no public transportation and certain areas having
limited mobility due to non-navigable roads). Once
measles cases have been identiﬁed in one location, the
time to intervene in the rest of the city needs to be
explored, especially while observing outbreaks lasting
more than 20 weeks in each context. A rapidly
deployed mass vaccination campaign might have
slowed down the spread of the epidemic, but how
much time is actually available to intervene with an
eﬀective reactive vaccination campaign?
Although some research has been conducted on
the spatial-temporal dynamics of measles epidemics in
resource-poor settings, research focuses on the most
eﬀective routine vaccination strategies, rather than
vaccination as an epidemic response option [6–8]. The
aim of this research was to explore the amount of time
available for intervention with a mass vaccination
campaign.
METHOD
We used surveillance data on previously reported
cases of measles from Kinshasa and Niamey. Data
for the epidemic in Kinshasa comprised of weekly
reported cases to the Ministry of Health for the 35
health districts in Kinshasa from January 2002 to
February 2003. For the epidemic in Niamey, data
comprised of weekly reported measles cases to public
health centres and hospitals from November 2003
to July 2004, aggregated for the three communes
(districts) in Niamey. Data from Kinshasa was
collected prospectively from the beginning of the
epidemic. Data was collected retrospectively from
public health centres in Niamey for the ﬁrst 3 months
of the outbreak and prospectively until July 2004. For
both investigations, the WHO clinical case deﬁnition
for measles was used. At the beginning of both out-
breaks, 10 cases were laboratory conﬁrmed through
detection of measles-speciﬁc IgM antibodies by the
ministries of health of both DRC and Niger. Details
on both epidemics have been described elsewhere
[9–11]. We considered the ﬁrst district (in Kinshasa)
or commune (in Niamey) where cases were reported
to be the index district. The epidemic was considered
to have spread to a district if there were two con-
secutive weeks during which at least one case had
been reported.
RESULTS
An increase in measles cases was reported in Kinshasa
beginning in January 2002 with cases reported
throughout the entire year and throughout 2003
(Fig. 1). In total, 17624 measles cases were reported.
The overall attack rate was 0.35% (17624/5032222).
Within health districts a median of 414 cumulative
cases were reported (range 65–1550). Within 1 week
the epidemic spread to two other health districts, and
to six health districts during the next 3 weeks, with 10
health districts reporting cases after 6 weeks. Of the
remaining health districts, cases did not appear for a
mean of 9 weeks later (median 7 weeks) (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 1. Reported measles cases in Kinshasa, Democratic
Republic of Congo (January 2002–February 2003).
2 R. F. Grais and othersThe measles epidemic in Niamey started in
November 2003 (deﬁned by a sharp increase in
reported cases over a period of 3 weeks) with peak
cases reported in March 2004. The epidemic began
to subside by the end of April 2004. In total,
the epidemic lasted 30 weeks. Between November
2003 and July 2004, a total of 10880 cases were
reported. The overall attack rate reached 1.4%
(10880/769454). At the commune level, 5789 cases
were reported in commune 1, 3598 cases in commune
2, and 587 cases in commune 3 (Fig. 3).
DISCUSSION
The prolonged duration of these two epidemics sug-
gest that there may have been enough time for early
intervention with a mass vaccination campaign in
Kinshasa or Niamey. Although halting a measles
epidemic entirely may be neither realistic nor feasible,
the goal of a reactive vaccination intervention after
the start of an epidemic in an index area would be to
reduce transmission in other parts of the city, which
have either not yet been aﬀected or are in an even
earlier stage. MSF routinely estimates that 15 days of
preparation are required from the decision to perform
a mass vaccination campaign and the ﬁrst dose
delivered [12]. During the Niamey epidemic, a vacci-
nation intervention occurred 24 weeks after the
beginning of the outbreak targeting 50% of children
aged between 6 and 59 months, regardless of vacci-
nation status. For this intervention, 56.9% of children
between the ages of 6 and 59 months [84563 (doses
delivered)/148595 (children between 6–59 months)],
regardless of their vaccination status, were vaccinated
at healthcentres in 1week. This reinforcement activity
demonstrates the feasibility of intervening during an
<4 weeks 0 5 km
N
Masina I
(Index District)
<8 weeks
<12 weeks
<16 weeks
16 weeks
Fig. 2. Map displaying the spatial and temporal progression of reported measles cases in 35 health districts of Kinshasa,
2002–2003. Health districts are coded by the number of weeks cases are ﬁrst reported (deﬁned as when there are two
consecutive weeks with at least one case reported) from the index district in 4-week increments beginning with darker shading
and progressing to lighter shading.
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Fig. 3. Reported measles cases in Niamey, Niger (November
2003–July 2004) by commune.
Mass vaccination intervention during measles epidemics 3epidemic within a short time and had the intervention
occurred earlier in the epidemic it might have averted
a signiﬁcant number of cases. If the intervention had
occurred before cases spread to commune 3 (6 weeks
after cases were reported in commune 1) it is likely
that many of these cases could have been averted. The
same holds true for Kinshasa, where there were sig-
niﬁcant delays in reporting between health districts.
An important second step in assessing the potential
success of such a campaign would be to explore
patterns of movement within urban areas and to begin
to determine the degree of isolation of neighbour-
hoods. The acquisition of geographic data, such as the
boundaries of health sectors, population size and
density estimates, as well as additional information on
population travel between health districts, is essential
in performing further analyses. Similarly, exploring
other African urban environments is also a logical
next step as population dynamics and the geography
of these cities play a critical role in determining
whether reactive vaccination interventions are ap-
propriate.
Reported measles cases, while indicating the
progress of an epidemic, are likely to underestimate
its true extent. Although measles is a well-recognized
illness in Kinshasa and Niamey avoiding any serious
misclassiﬁcation problems, only a fraction of cases are
likely to be reported. It is important to point out that
although measles cases are routinely underestimated
in surveillance data, it is this data that would be
used to determine whether a measles outbreak was
occurring. That is, surveillance data is that used in
practice to follow the evolution of measles epidemics
in Kinshasa and Niamey and the data used for
public-health decision-making. A successful outbreak
response intervention depends on the ability of
existing surveillance systems to report cases promptly.
Although the slow progression of these two epi-
demics suggests that current policies could beneﬁt
from a second look, there needs to be a public health
capacity for rapid intervention with an eﬃcacious
vaccination campaign. In practice, these conditions
are not necessarily met. Interventions rely on the
expertise and resources available from the Ministry
of Health and/or medical non-governmental organiz-
ations. Logistic constraints, available human re-
sources, community participation, and management
of injection safety are among the challenges. In
reality, reactive vaccination campaigns are also likely
to target all children within a city rather than just
speciﬁc neighbourhoods for both ethical and logistic
reasons. Our primary contribution is to provide a
starting point for discussion of some of the public
health policy issues surrounding mass vaccination
intervention during measles epidemics and to suggest
future areas of research. Important questions remain
to be addressed including the age range to be targeted
during a reactive vaccination campaign.
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